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OF UNFAITHFUL AGENT--

Plaintiff, manager of defendant's mechanical division under a contract requiring
him to devote all his efforts to this employment and providing that he would
share the profits and losses of the division equally with defendant as his only
compensation, sued to recover a balance of $42,991.90 in his favor after his discharge by defendant. The contract provided that on "any termination" of
plaintiff's employment his account should be adjusted and any ~redit balance paid
him, but defendant contended that plaintiff had forfeited his right to compensation by secretly engaging in a partnership in competition with defendant. The
trial c_ourt found that defendant w:5 not substantially harmed by this activity but
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RECENT DECISIONS

dismissed plaintiff's bill for an accounting. On appeal, held, reversed. The infidelity of plaintiff as an agent should not, as between him and his principal,
entail consequences in the matter of compensation which his principal has agreed
should not follow from it, although plaintiff will be charged with the entire
$1,630.74 profit of his secret occupation and, in addition, any damages defendant may be able to prove at the second trial. Walsh v. Atlantic Research
Associates, Inc., (Mass. 1947) 71 N.E. (2d) 580.
It is familiar law that an agent must conduct himself with utmost fidelity
to the interests of his principal 1 and that it is a breach of this duty for him to
devote time and effort to competing interests. 2 If an agent acquires a benefit
througl} breach of his duty of loyalty, the principal is entitled to recover what he
has so received-0r its value, and also the amount of damages thereby caused him. 8
Another measure designed to secure performance. of this duty is the denial of
compensation to a disloyal agent, although there are no absolute rules in this
field and much is left to the discretion of the court.4 An example of the .extent
to which a court may exercise its discretion in such cases is found in the holding
of the Oklahoma Supreme Court 5 that a disloyal agent who failed to inform
his principal that a third party had broken the contract which the agent negotiated between the principal and the third party might recover compensation but
at a reduced rate .fixed arbitrarily by the qmrt. A well-known Louisiana case 6
held an agent entitled to compensation for a period during which he had been
successfully persuading his principal's employees to enter a competing business
and at the same time failing to secure renewals of the contracts between the principal and its regular clients. On the other hand, several recent cases have denied
all compensation to a disloyal agent7 or allowed the principal to recover salary
1

MECHEM, AGENCY, 3d ed., §297, p. 190 (1923).
MECHEM, AGENCY, 3d ed., §303, p. 195 (1923).
8
RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT, §138, P· 556 (1937); 2 AGENCY RESTATEMENT,
§403, p. 922, and §407(1), p. 931 (1933).
' "The question whether a fiduciary who has not been entirely faithful will be denied
compensation to which he would otherwise be entitled ultimately rests in the discretion
of the court." Shulkin v. Shulkin, 301 Mass. 184 at 193, 194, 16 N. E. (2d) 644
(1938), 118 A.L.R. 629 (1938). See also, Johnson v. Powers, 188 Okla. 508, III
P. (2d) 191 (1941).
5 Johnson v. Powers, 188 Okla. 508, III P. (2d) 191 (1941).
6 Jones v. Ernst & Ernst, I 72 La. 406, 134 S. 375 ( I 931). A recent holding that a
disloyal agent was entitled to compensation is Willis v. Van Woy, 155 Fla. 465, 20 S.
(2d) 690 (1945), where the agent secured property at $37,500, telling his principal
the price was $75,000 and intending to keep the difference.
7
Steinmetz v. Kern, 375 Ill. 616, 32 N. E. (2d) 151 (1941) (agent seeking to
profit by deceiving his principal as to how the affairs of her apartment building were
being handled); Sundland v. Korfund Co., Inc., 260 App. Div. So, 20 N. Y. S. (2d)
8 19 ( I 940) (agent stealing from principal during the period covered by the compensation sought); Stein v. Steiner, 289 Ill. App. 618, 7 N. E. (2d) 505 (1937) (agent who
had introduced principal to a pr~pective client later sought to procure the sale for a
competitor); Lamdin v. Broadway Surface Advertising Corp., 272 N. Y. 133, 5 N. E.
(2d) 66 (1936) (agent seeking payment in due bills rather than cash where he received
secret commission from due bill brokers on all due bills his principal discounted).
2
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already paid,8 even though _this may have resulted in an unexpected windfall to
the principal. It is immaterial in the application of this rule whether or not the
principal suffers loss as the result of the' agent's disloyalty,9 and it has been held
that a partner is entitled to his regular share of the secret profits for which he
must account 10 on the theory that the parties are thereby placed in the position
in which they would have been had there been no disloyalty, although this holding, in effect, allows him his normal compensation for disloyal activity. There is
disagreement as to the foundation of the rule, some cou.rts and writers saying
that its basis is the public policy in removing the danger of temptation from the
agent's way,11 while Massachusetts and other jurisdictions deny compensation
to unfaithful agents on the ground that payment is not due for service improperly
performed.12 Courts holding to the latter theory may allow a disloyal agent to
recover for services properly rendered for which the compensation is apportioned·
in the contract, but not for services tainted with intentional disloyalty.18 Had
Massachusetts not belonged to this group, it would have been hard for the court
in the principal case to have justified giving effect to the contract between the
parties in allowing the unfaithful agent to recover his compensation: although
1
the agent's infidelity would not exclude recovery under the broad terms of the
contract,14 the policy against an enticement for the agent is sa11 applicable.
Nevertheless, a court following the public pblicy theory might well have reached
the same result reached by the court in the principal case on the theory that the
disloyalty in this case did not substantially affect the agency relationship.15

Edwin M. Deal, S.Ed.
8 Anderson Cotton Mills v. Royal Mfg. Co., 221 N. C. 500, 20 S. E. (2d) 818
(1942) (agent to sell buying secretly on his own account).
9
Steinmetz v. Kern, 375 Ill. 616 at 621, 32 N. E. (2d) 151 (1941): "An agent
is entitled to compensation only on a due and faithful performance of all his duties
to his principal. In the, application of this rule it makes no difference whether the
result of the agent's conduct is injurious to the principal or not as the misconduct of
the agent affects the contract from considerations of public policy rather than of injury
to the principal." See also, 1 MECHEM, AGENCY, 2d ed., §1589, p. II89 (1914).
10
Shulkin v. Shulkin, 301 Mass. 184, 16 N. E. (2d) 644 (1938).
- 11 Steinmetz v. Kern, 375 Ill. 616, 32 N. E. (2d) 151 (1941); 1 MECHEM,
AGENCY, 2d ed., §1589, p. II89 (1914).
12 Principal case, 71 N. E. (2d) 580 at 586, "Even in cases of strict trust and
where the trustee is not helped by any provision of the contract, there is no absolute
rule that he should lose his compensation, and when he does lose it this is not upon
the theory of a penalty, but is upon the theory that he should not be paid for improper
service."
18
"The American Law Institute finds the basis for refusal of compensation to a
trustee not in the theory of a penalty, but in the theory that payment is not due for
service improperly performed. . . • Apparently on similar reasoning, a disloyal agent
may have compensation which is apportioned by the contract of employment to services
'properly performed."· Lydia E. Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gove, 303 Mass. l at 4,
20 N. E. (2d) 482 (1939). See also, 2 AGENCY RESTATEMENT, §456, p. 1075
(1933).
'
14
"Upon any termination of Walsh's employment his account shall be adjusted
...." Principal cas·e at 582. (Italics supplied.)
15
Sundland v. Korfund Co., Inc., 260 App. Div. So, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 819
at 821 (1940), "where the dishonesty of a servant is of such character as to justify

